


# Advanced Software V&V for Civil Aviation and Autonomy

Dr. Guillaume Brat NASA Ames Research Center


### Motivation for V&V research





The Decadal Survey for Civil
Aeronautics and the NextGen
Integrated WorkPlan both call for more
research on the validation and
verification of complex systems






- Software costs are very high
- V&V cost is 40-50% of the SW cost
- Driven by certification requirements

Example of typical cost in Aviation


### Reasons for the high cost of S/W



Phase in which error was detected and corrected

# Areas addressed by NASA tools





# Current V&V Tools and Capabilities

Requires theorem prover expertise Combination of formal method with control theory experts

Accessible to moderate/ expert programmer

Requires proficiency in statistics

**EXPERTISE** 

**PVS** 

Algorithmic proofs using theorem proving

Simulink, C, Stateflow

Model checking for checking/ guaranteeing safety requirements

limited C++

Static code analysis for run-time errors and safety requirements blackbox

Statistical-based testing to learn unsafe boundaries of operation

TARGET

**CAPABILITY** 

Requirements

Design

Code

**Testing** 

Operation

# Future V&V Tools and Capabilities

Accessible to engineers

Accessible to engineers

Accessible to programmer

Requires proficiency in statistics

**EXPERTISE** 

English-like

SCADE MatLab Full C++
Floating-point
analysis

blackbox

**TARGET** 

Requirement capture and analysis

Checking/
guaranteeing
safety
requirements
on design models

Static code analysis for run-time errors Statistical-based testing to learn unsafe boundaries of operation

**CAPABILITY** 

Requirements

Design

Code

Testing

Operation

## FAA/Regulator Needs



Standards Current

**NASA** engagement

Software Development Lifecycle (RTCA **DO-178C** / **DO-278B**)

Assumes the requirements are correct and complete

material

use of formal V&V

methods

Update standards Framework for new process

Identify/develop new process

> **Training** material

**Training** 

**Update standards and** processes to allow for

**Educate certifiers so that** results from new V&V techniques can be understood and accepted

Train certifiers **Employ** new certification process



Safety Cases **Assurance Cases** 



### **Assurance Cases**


- An assurance case is
  - A set of assurance claims connected to a body of evidence through a structured argument, to provide a comprehensive, defensible and valid justification that a system meets its assurance requirements for a given application in a defined operating environment

#### **Assurance Case**

- Structured database of assurance assets with tracing relations and semantics
- A means for integrating safety and mission assurance (S&MA) information.




### **Assurance Cases**






### **Assurance Cases and Lifecycle**







### **Assurance Cases and Lifecycle**




### **Assurance Cases and Autonomy**



### **Assurance Cases and Autonomy**




### **Assurance Cases and Autonomy**






### Conclusions

- **Goal**: Address the impact of V&V of overall cost of S/W for aviation
- Solution: Bring V&V earlier in the lifecycle by using formal methods
- **Status**: Prototype tools for all phases
  - Requirement tool is in its infancy





- **Innovation**: gather V&V evidences in assurance cases that extend
- **Future**: Address V&V of autonomy through the use of assurance cases at runtime